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The Moral Significance of
Empathy: A Scottish
Sentimentalist Perspective
By Xiaolong Wang
Abstract: Which feature of human nature accounts for moral motivation? From a Scottish
Sentimentalist perspective, the answer lies in our fellow feelings: empathy, the capacity
for sharing what other people feel; and sympathy, the capacity for feeling concern for
other people’s well-being. Recently, disagreement has emerged within Scottish
Sentimentalism on which of the two fellow feelings does the real work in motivating
moral acts. Paul Bloom famously argues that sympathy is sufficient for moral motivation
with the help of theory of mind (or often called mind reading), and thus concludes that
empathy is not necessary from a Scottish Sentimentalist perspective. I argue that Bloom’s
conclusion is too quick. With the latest views of the complicated nature of empathy, I
argue that empathy is necessary for forming sympathy due to its three contributions that
theory of mind cannot make: the appreciation of other people’s suffering given their
situation, the empathic perspective-taking that breaks the boundary between self and
others, and the phenomenal knowledge of how bad other people’s suffering feels. Hence,
empathy is indirectly necessary for moral motivation by virtue of being directly necessary
for sympathy (because sympathy is a direct necessary condition for moral motivation
according to Scottish Sentimentalism). Therefore, I conclude contra Bloom that empathy
is necessary, though indirectly, for moral motivation from a Scottish Sentimentalist
perspective.
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1. Introduction
Philosophers and moral psychologists have long been interested in the
nature of moral motivation. Which feature of human nature accounts for our moral
motivations? Does reason, sentiment, intellectual intuition or something else
motivate us to do moral things? Moral sentimentalists1 contend that sentiments are
essential for moral motivations, but disagree on which sentiments are of
fundamental importance. An influential camp of sentimentalism about moral
motivation argues that the sentiments essential for moral motivation are our two
types of fellow feelings: empathy, the sentiment of sharing what other people feel,
and sympathy2, the sentiment of feeling concern for other people’s well-being (at
the first approximation). 3 Since this camp is founded by the eighteenth-century
Scottish sentimentalists such as Francis Hutcheson, David Hume and Adam
Smith, let us call this camp the Scottish Sentimentalism about moral motivation 4
(hereafter, Scottish Sentimentalism), though it is also defended by many
contemporary philosophers and moral psychologists5.
Recently, disagreement has emerged within Scottish Sentimentalism on
which one of the two fellow feelings is necessary for motivating moral behavior.
The eighteenth-century sentimentalists put a strong emphasis on empathy.
However, in the recent decade, the significance of empathy to moral motivation
1

Moral sentimentalism is a general view of the importance of sentiments to morality. In this paper,
I use moral sentimentalism in a narrow sense, meaning the particular sentimentalism about moral
motivation. So, I will not discuss sentimentalist accounts of other moral phenomena, such as Shaun
Nichol’s sentimentalism about moral judgment, or Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson’s
sentimentalism about moral concepts, etc. See respectively Nichols, Shaun. Sentimental rules: On
the natural foundations of moral judgment. Oxford University Press, 2004, and D'arms, Justin, and
Daniel Jacobson. "Sentiment and value." Ethics 110, no. 4 (2000): 722-748.
2
Contemporary philosophers tend to use ‘sympathy,’ ‘pity,’ ‘compassion,’ ‘concern’
interchangeably, while contemporary psychologists prefer ‘empathic concern.’ For the sake of
convenience, I will use ‘sympathy’ throughout the paper
3
Other sentiments of potential moral importance include self-blame emotions such as guilt and
shame and other-blame emotions such as contempt, anger, disgust. See Schroeder, Timothy, Adina
L. Roskies, and Shaun Nichols. "Moral motivation." In Doris, John M., and Moral Psychology
Research Group. The moral psychology handbook. OUP Oxford, (2010), at 122
4
As I said in Note 1, I will not talk about sentimentalism about other moral phenomena in addition
to moral motivation, and so accordingly, I will also not talk about Scottish Sentimentalism about
other moral phenomena, such as Scottish Sentimentalism about moral judgment, the view that
empathy and sympathy are fundamental to moral judgment. See Slote, Michael. The ethics of care
and empathy. Routledge, (2007).
5
See Hoffman, Martin L. Empathy and Moral Development: Implications for Caring and
Justice. Cambridge University Press, 2000, and “Empathy, Justice and Social Change.” In Empathy
and Morality, edited by Heidi L. Maibom, 71-96. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014; Batson,
C. D., Klein, T. R., Highberger, L. & L, S. L., 1995. Immorality from empathy-induced altruism:
When compassion and justice conflict. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Volume 68,
pp. 1042-54; Simmons, Aaron. "In Defense of The Moral Significance of Empathy." Ethical
Theory and Moral Practice 17, no. 1 (2014): 97-111; Persson, Ingmar, and Julian Savulescu. "The
Moral Importance of Reflective Empathy." Neuroethics 11, no. 2 (2018): 183-193; Jefferson,
William. “The Moral Significance of Empathy.” PhD diss., University of Oxford, 2019.
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has received severe criticism from within the camp of Scottish Sentimentalism,
which started by Jesse Prinz’s challenge in 2011 6 and matured as Paul Bloom’s
monograph Against Empathy: The Case for Rational Compassion7 came out in
2016. The common line of argument in the criticism is that for motivating moral
behavior within a sentimentalist picture, only sympathy should be promoted while
empathy should be completely abandoned because empathy is not only
unnecessary but also detrimental to moral motivation.
In this paper, I will raise an objection to the prominent skeptic view about
the significance of empathy to moral motivation developed by Bloom, and argue
that Scottish Sentimentalism must need empathy to explain moral motivation,
though in an indirect way. In section 2, I will introduce Bloom’s objection to the
significance of empathy and his view of the importance of sympathy. In section 3,
I will raise an objection to Bloom’s view, arguing that he does not have the
resource to explain where sympathy comes from. In section 4, I correct Bloom’s
mischaracterization of the nature of empathy and argue contra Bloom while
sympathy can solely generate moral motivation, sympathy itself cannot be
generated without empathy, and so empathy is indirectly necessary for moral
motivation from a Scottish Sentimentalist perspective. In section 5, I will consider
three anticipated objections, and I will conclude in section 6.

2.

Bloom’s Skepticism About Empathy and Support for Sympathy

Among historic and contemporary philosophers and psychologists who are
in favor of Scottish Sentimentalism, the concepts of empathy and sympathy have
been used to refer to various fellow-feeling-related phenomena, so unsurprisingly,
Bloom starts his argument with stipulations of what he means by empathy,
sympathy, and other fellow-feeling-related concepts.
First, Bloom uses the concept of empathy to refer to “the act of feeling
what you believe other people feel – experiencing what they experience.”8 So, in
Bloom’s view, empathy is an affective mental state in which the empathizer
experiences a feeling that is similar to what he thinks the empathized person is
feeling, where the feeling that Bloom focuses on is mainly the negative feeling of
physical pain and emotional distress. Second, Bloom distinguishes empathy as an
affective state from theory of mind as a cognitive state 9 . By theory of mind,
6

See both Prinz, Jesse. “Is Empathy Necessary for Morality?." Empathy: Philosophical and
psychological perspectives 1 (2011): 211-229, and "Against empathy." The Southern Journal of
Philosophy 49 (2011): 214-233.
7
Bloom, Paul. Against empathy: The Case For Rational Compassion. New York: HarperCollins,
2016.
8
Supra note 7, at 3.
9
Bloom uses ‘theory of mind,’ ‘social cognition,’ ‘social intelligence,’ ‘mind reading,’
‘mentalizing’ interchangeably. (Id.) Bloom even thinks that ‘theory of mind’ is the cognitive form
of empathy – namely ‘cognitive empathy’ that is contrasted with ‘affective empathy.’ But given
that Bloom has clearly said that “The notion of empathy that I’m most interested in is the act of
feeling what you believe other people feel— experiencing what they experience,” (Id, at 13) I will
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Bloom means the act of understanding what’s going on in the minds of other
people without any contagion of feeling. That said, by theory of mind we read the
thoughts, desires, feelings of other people without necessarily feeling the similar
mental states in our minds, which thus makes this process of mind-reading
cognitive rather than affective. Third, as most Scottish sentimentalists do, Bloom
makes a distinction between empathy and sympathy10. To empathize with other
people’s feelings is to share or mirror their feelings, no matter whether their
feelings are positive or negative. For example, if you are distressed, I would also
feel similar distress on my end if I empathize with you. If you are happy, I will
also feel happy in a similar way when empathizing with you. By contrast, instead
of mirroring other people’s feelings, to sympathize with other people is to feel
concern for their well-being, generating a feeling of worry about their unhappiness
and a feeling of wanting them to be good (physically, mentally, economically,
etc.).
With these concepts in hand, we can get into Bloom’s argument for his
view that Scottish Sentimentalism should abandon empathy and promote
sympathy. As I read Bloom, the argument has three main premises.
First, drawing on the influential psychological studies of empathy by C.
Daniel Batson, Bloom argues that though empathy can generate altruistic
motivation which is sometimes morally unproblematic, empathy in fact often
motivates altruistic behavior in a morally objectionable way due to its biased
nature. To begin with, it is sometimes questioned that empathy cannot lead to
altruistic motivation because empathy with other people’s distress can bring us
personal distress, which tends to motivate us to distance ourselves from the
distressing situation instead of being moved to help. But Batson shows that this is
not the case because in his experiments, subjects are motivated to help the sufferer
when empathizing with them even if it is way easier to avoid the situation than
offering help. 11 However, Bloom argues that altruistic behavior is not equal to
moral behavior because altruistic behavior can clash with significant moral
considerations like justice and fairness. Further, he argues that empathy-based
altruistic behavior is often morally objectionable in such a way because empathy
is often biased like a spotlight and thus innumerate: we are more likely to
empathize with the sufferers who are physically or relationally closer to us and
so ignore those who are in more severe suffering and more urgent need from a
larger populational perspective. For example, in one of Batson’s experiments, for
a ten-year-old girl named Sheri Summers who had a fatal disease and was waiting
in line for treatment, subjects are motivated by their empathy (induced by
experimenters) to help move her to the front of the line to alleviate her pain as
not use ‘cognitive empathy’ when reformulating Bloom’s argument to avoid conceptual confusion.
For a more detailed exporation of ‘cognitive empathy,’ see Spaulding, Shannon. "Cognitive
empathy." In The Routledge handbook of philosophy of empathy, pp. 13-21. Routledge, 2017.
10
Bloom uses ‘compassion’ and ‘concern’ most often while only using ‘sympathy’ and ‘pity’
for several times in his book. For convenience, I will stick to ‘sympathy’ in this paper.
11
See Batson, C. D., Klein, T. R., Highberger, L. & L, S. L., 1995. Immorality from empathyinduced altruism: When compassion and justice conflict. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, Volume68, pp. 1042-54.

5

soon as possible even if they were told that ahead of Sheri there were other
children who were presumably more deserving, which is obvious injustice to other
children.12
Second, Bloom further argues that Scottish Sentimentalists should not
worry about abandoning empathy because sympathy combined with theory of
mind is sufficient for moral motivation. To be motivated to help others within a
sentimentalist picture, one needs to 1) know what others need or suffer and 2) feel
the motive to help satisfy their need or alleviate their suffering. Empathy is able to
motivate us to help (though often in a morally objectionable way) because it
makes us 1) know what others feel by generating a similar feeling on our end, and
2) feel the motive to help others which comes from the similar feeling we have on
our end13. But according to Bloom, these two jobs of empathy can be smoothly
taken over by theory of mind and sympathy respectively. By theory of mind, we
1) read what others need or suffer from their behavioral, linguistic, facial cues
without necessarily having a similar mental state. By sympathy, we 2) feel the
motive to help others because sympathy itself is a feeling of concern for other
people’s well-being and a feeling of wanting other people to be good.
Third, the combination of sympathy and theory of mind can not only take
over the function of empathy but also do better than empathy. According to
Bloom, on the one hand, although both empathy and sympathy can be affected by
spotlight bias, sympathy is more diffuse and tamable than empathy. Sympathy is
more diffuse in the sense that we can form concern for a large number of people
or an abstract issue such as environmental protection which is hard to be
empathized with. Sympathy is more tamable in the sense that it is less immune to
voluntary self-control while more compliant to the guidance of reason. On the
other hand, similarly, theory of mind can provide us with the knowledge of what’s
going on in others’ minds from a distanced perspective that does not get us
emotionally involved too much in the sufferer’s distress so that we are less likely
to be biased due to the strong empathic emotions.
3.

The Problem For Bloom: Where Does Sympathy Come From?

In the last section, we have seen that Bloom argues that Scottish
Sentimentalism should replace empathy with sympathy plus theory of mind
because the latter is sufficient for moral motivation and can even motivate moral
behaviors in a more controllable, rational and non-biased way. Although I
seriously doubt this is the case 14, I argue that even if empathy turns out to be more
untamable, irrational and biased, Bloom’s view is still problematic, and thus
Scottish Sentimentalism cannot abandon empathy in explaining moral motivation.
A starter to see how Bloom goes astray is to consider a significant but
12

Id.

13

I will explain how this is so later in section 4.
For similar objections to Bloom in this direction, see Persson and Savulescu (2018), and Zaki,
Jamil. “Moving Beyond Stereotypes of Empathy.” Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 21(2) (2017): 59–
60.
14
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unanswered question in Bloom’s view: where does sympathy come from? 15 If
sympathy is the act of feeling concern for other people, how could we be
concerned about someone who has nothing to do with us? Perhaps Bloom could
reply that though we tend to sympathize with those who are closer to us, we could
extend our concern to strangers through moral reasoning. For instance, maybe we
can generalize from our concern for people of importance to us to reach an idea
that all persons are worthy of our concern. 16 However, this still does not answer
where our previous concern for people close to us comes from, namely what
makes us sympathize with people close to us.
It seems that the most available resource for Bloom’s sentimentalism to
explain the source of sympathy is theory of mind that he uses together with
sympathy to explain moral motivation. Again, theory of mind refers to our ability
to read what’s going on in others’ minds without feeling similar mental states in
our minds. So, theory of mind appears to be able to promote sympathy by helping
us see that others are in pain or distress, which gives us reason to feel concern for
the sufferers.
However, theory of mind itself is never sufficient to generate sympathy for
other people. Consider the most extreme case: psychopathy, a mental disorder
associated with traits such as persistent violent and antisocial behavioral
tendencies, impaired emotion systems, boldness, selfishness, etc. 17 It has been
established in abnormal psychology that psychopaths have no trouble in their
capacity for theory of mind: they do well in reading other minds through bodily
cues, which is often a means for them to exploit other people effectively for
egoistic purposes. 18 However, psychopaths systematically lack sympathy for
other people even if they can recognize their pain and distress, which means
theory of mind is not sufficient for sympathy for other people.
Then, what deficiency explains the lack of sympathy and moral concern in
psychopaths? Although it seems psychologists have not explored the cause of
psychopaths’ lack of sympathy in particular, there is a rich literature on what
deficiency of psychopaths explain their failure to understand moral right and
wrong, which I think can shed light on what causes lack of sympathy in
psychopaths, given that their failure to understand moral norms is often
characterized (perhaps from a sentimentalist perspective) as knowing what is
15

Persson and Savulescu (2018) also recognize this problem of Bloom’s view and propose
empathy as the solution to it. However, my view in section 4 differs from their proposal in two
important ways. For one, we disagree on what real empathy is. For another, we disagree on how
empathy is necessary for empathy.
16
See Gopnik, Alison. The Philosophical Baby: What Children's Minds Tell Us About Truth,
Love and the Meaning Of Life. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009, at 209.
17
Maibom, Heidi. "Psychopathy: Morally incapacitated persons." Handbook of the Philosophy of
Medicine (2017): 1131-1144.
18
See Felisberti, Fatima Maria, and Robert King. "Mind-Reading in altruists and
psychopaths." In Neuroscience and Social Science, pp. 121-140. Springer, Cham, 2017. Richell,
Rebecca A., Derek GV Mitchell, C. Newman, A. Leonard, Simon Baron-Cohen, and R. James R.
Blair. "Theory of mind and psychopathy: can psychopathic individuals read the ‘language of the
eyes’?." Neuropsychologia 41, no.5 (2003): 523-526.
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morally right and wrong in an undedicated way, namely without being concerned
about living up the that moral knowledge. As Heidi L. Maibom 19 recently
surveyed, although there has not been a unanimous agreement among
psychologists on what is responsible for psychopaths failing to understand moral
right and wrong, a popular view claims that the deficient emotions are the real
answer, of which the best candidate is often thought to be the deficient empathy of
psychopaths.
Enlightened by these psychopath studies, I think that empathy is a good
candidate for answering Bloom’s unanswered question about where sympathy
comes from. But although these psychopath studies suggest a close relationship
between empathy and sympathy, the discoveries are not decisive.20 Hence, I must
provide a philosophical argument for the significance of empathy to sympathy
that does not rely on the current controversial psychological studies.
4.

Why Is Empathy Necessary for Sympathy

To see how empathy is necessary for sympathy, we need to first correct
Bloom’s mischaracterization of empathy. Recall that by ‘empathy’ Bloom means
feeling what one believes other people feel, namely an affective state in which the
empathizer experiences a feeling that is similar to what he thinks another one is
feeling.This characterization lowers the bar of empathy too much. Consider the
following case.
John and Amanda are roommates. One day, John excitedly told Amanda that
his boss assigns an important design task to him so that he got the precious
chance to impress his boss and get a promotion. However, whenever Amanda
comes back home, she sees John relaxing instead of working. She asks John
when he expects he can finish the design, and John always says to finish it on
the next day. One night in the next week, John comes to Amanda’s room to
complain in deep frustration that his boss does not like his work and the
promotion is finally offered to his colleague. John’s emotional distress is so
strong that it evokes interpersonal emotional contagion, and thus Amanda
feels a similar episode of distress affected by the emotional congation.
However, despite the felt similar distress, Amanda does not think John’s
frustration makes sense because in her eyes, John is responsible for his failure
given that he did not make enough effort to work on the design.

For this case, no matter whether John has made enough efforts to finish the
task, would we like to say that Amanda is empathizing with John’s frustration
when having a similar feeling of frustration? I think we would not. The basic
attitude of Amanda is to deny John’s distress as an appropriate response to his
situation. In other words, Amanda is averse to John’s distress instead of
appreciating it. As a result, we can expect that Amanda would not show any
19
20

Supra note 17, at 1118.
Id, at 1119.

8

concern for John’s loss of promotion or give any comforting words, but rather
would be more likely to keep silent or even (perhaps mildly) blame John for
insufficient efforts. Thus, in the first place, real empathy requires the empathizer
to appreciate other people’s feeling as appropriate (or fitting, proper) given their
situation, which dates back to one of the founders of Scottish Sentiemtnalism
Adam Smith 21 , and has recently become one of the latest consensuses on the
conditions of empathy. 22
Further clarification about how we feel what other people feel in empathy
is also needed. As we just saw in the John case, emotional contagion – the
phenomenon where one’s emotion is so strong that it directly passes to or bleeds
onto another person – is unreliable for empathy because it is often independent of
our evaluation of the appropriateness of other people’s feeling. Then, what makes
us feel what other people feel in empathy? The answer is a unique kind of
perspective-taking, the act of imagining ourselves being other people and
figuring out what we as them would feel in the given situation. For example,
Amanda might imagine what she would feel if she becomes John in his situation.
By imagining that she as John gets an important task from her employer, sets
herself a goal of finishing the task beautifully and so getting a promotion, but later
wastes time on weekdays and finally fails to impress her employer, Amanda can
feel shameful because she thinks that she was too lazy to live up to her own
standard. This is how imaginative perspective-taking can generate an empathic
feeling. Notice that in this new scenario, we are entitled to say that Amanda feels
empathy for John, but Amanda feels empathy for John not because she has a
similar episode of distress with John affected by emotional congation, but because
she feels shame for John, which is a feeling that she believes to be appropriate for
John to feel in his situation despite John did not feel it.23
With these clarifications, we can see that real empathy is more
complicated than some Scottish sentimentalists like Bloom characterize, which is
probably the main reason why empathy is undervalued in generating moral
motivation. As we see, empathy has an affective component of feeling an
appropriate emotion. It has cognitive components of recognizing the empathized
person’s situation and imagining being the empathized person. It also has an
evaluative component of figuring out what is appropriate for the empathized
person to feel in her situation. So, we now get a mature view of what real empathy
is:
Real empathy is to feel what one believes to be appropriate for other
people to feel in their situation through imagining being them and figuring
out what one would feel in their situation.
21

Smith, Adam. The theory of moral sentiments. Penguin, 2010.
See Maibom, Heidi Lene, ed. The Routledge handbook of philosophy of empathy. New York:
Routledge, 2017, at 2.
23
Hence, real empathy does not need a perfect affective match between the empathizer and the
empathized. See Schwan, David. "Does Affective Empathy Require Perspective-Taking or
Affective Matching?." American Philosophical Quarterly 56, no. 3 (2019): 277-288.
22
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With the correct view of empathy in hand, now we can get into the core question:
for Scottish Sentimentalis like Bloom, how is empathy helpful in filling the gap
between theory of mind and sympathy? I argue that compared to theory of mind,
the contribution of empathy to the formation of sympathy is three-fold.
First, while theory of mind only gives us descriptive knowledge of what’s
going on in other minds, empathy involves an appreciation of the empathized
person’s feeling (if it is appropriate) in light of the given situation, which clears
people’s potential aversive or indifferent attitude to the empathized person’s
feeling due to an incomplete understanding of her situation. We can see how this
is so by tweaking the Amanda-John case one more time. Other things being equal,
suppose that it happens that Amanda comes back home whenever John is having a
fast break between hard work. So, John in fact made a lot of efforts to finish the
design task but Amanda mistakenly believes that he did not. Also, the fact is that
John’s boss does not like his work because of some bad discrimination, of which
both John and Amanda are ignorant. Then, after John knows that he messed up
and comes back to complain about his boss with Amanda, she recognizes that
John is in distressful frustration by inferring from his behavioral, linguistic, facial
cues. But due to her misunderstanding of the situation, Amanda fails to empathize
with John in the sense that she does not appreciate his frustration. So, her averse
attitude to John’s frustration remains all the time, which motivates her to tend to
blame John and so blocks her from sympathizing with him.
Nonetheless, the appreciation of the empathized person’s feeling is just a
necessary condition that does suffice for sympathy. So, we should go on to find
more features of empathy to explain the formation of sympathy for other people.
Second, while theory of mind provides us with the knowledge of what’s
going on in other minds in a distanced way, empathy relates other people’s feeling
to ourselves through the unique kind of perspective-taking so that it motivates us
to be concerned about other people’s feeling just like our own. 24 As we can see in
the cold-blooded people (not necessarily psychopaths), there is a boundary
between others and self lying in the gap between theory of mind and sympathy
for other people. The cold-blooded people have no difficulty in reading other
minds and recognizing others’ pain and distress, but this often means nothing to
them because it is other people’s suffering instead of their own. By contrast,
empathy can help break the boundary between self and others at least to some
extent. In empathizing with other people in suffering, we imagine being them and
thus getting into their situation, which in some sense generated an experiencer in
which we and the empathized person are unified. Then, we as the unified
experiencer realize how bad that situation is, and what kind of reaction we would
24

It might be objected that theory of mind can also involve perspective-taking, which is often
called ‘simulation’ in philosophy of mind. So my argument might be said to be unfair to supporters
of theory of mind like Bloom. However, I will argue later in section 4 that empathy does more than
just perspective-taking because empathy can provide us with the phemonemal knowledge of how
bad other people’s suffering feels that can strengthen the reason for sympathizing them, which
cannot be guaranteed by perspective-taking.
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appropriately have in that situation – say, pain and distress. Since in imagination
we become the unified experiencer, the pain and distress falling on the empathized
person also falls on us through our imagination, and hence evokes our sympathy
for ourselves, namely feeling concern for our unhappiness. Finally, since our
sympathy is formed when we are as the unified experiencer, that sympathy is not
only directed at my well-being but also the well-being of the empathized person as
another part of the unified experiencer. Therefore, through this emotionally
charged perspective-taking, empathy helps us to extend the sympathy for our own
well-being to other people’s well-being.
Third, empathy also generates a vivid affective feeling – often pain and
distress, echoing the empathized person’s suffering – that helps us learn how bad
the empathized person feels and thus strengthens the reason to show concern for
her. In fact, this has been partly mentioned in the last paragraph when I talk about
how emotionally charged empathic perspective-taking can direct our sympathy for
ourselves to other people, but the significance of the affective feature of empathy
is worth discussing independently because it is an important feature that not only
theory of mind (as we saw in the last paragraph) but also general perspectivetaking might not have.
In general perspective-taking, we imagine being other people and figuring
out what they are feeling, but this process could be done in a non-affective way in
which we end up knowing what others feel in an abstract manner. For example,
we can imagine right now being some victims, figuring out what we would feel,
namely great pain and distress and thus attribute them to the victims. But we could
take such a perspective without necessarily having a similar kind of pain and
distress in our mind. As a result, we have no idea of how bad that pain and
distress feel, and so feel less motivated to show sympathetic concern for their
suffering. By contrast, empathy requires one to stand in a closer position to the
empathized person – acquired often by being exposed to details as rich as possible
about the situation of the empathized person, delivered by witnessing, narratives,
videos – to an extent that the position is close enough for the empathizer to
actually feel the affective state that she inferred from imaginative perspectivetaking. And compared to theory of mind and general perspective-taking, the
significance of this affective feeling of empathy is that it offers us a piece of
phenomenal knowledge about how bad other people’s suffering feels and thus
strengthens the reason to show (more) sympathetic concern for them, provided we
have already felt the reason to show sympathy to them by unifying ourselves and
the empathized targets in the empathic perspective-taking. Thus, the affective
feature of empathy serves as a significant supplement to the empathic perspectivetaking, strengthening our willingness to show (more) sympathy for the empathized
person.25
25

For a more detailed defense of how the affective feature of empathy contributes to moral
motivation in this way, see Jefferson, William. “The Moral Significance of Empathy.” PhD diss.,
University of Oxford, 2019. For other defenses of the significance of affective feature of empathy,
see Simmons (2014) and Marshall, Colin. Compassionate Moral Realism. Oxford University Press,
2018.
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If my argument for the three-fold necessary contribution of empathy to
sympathy is correct, Bloom’s view will be in danger. To clarify, I agree with
Bloom that sympathy together with theory of mind can be sufficient for specific
moral motivations from a Scottish Sentimentalist perspective. After all, there are
so many everyday cases where we can be motivated to do the morally good thing
without empathizing with the target; for example, when a mother sees her child
drowning in the water, she would be immediately motivated to save her child
simply out of her sympathy and concern for her child together with her awareness
that her child is in danger gained by theory of mind. However, this does not mean
that Scottish Sentimentalism should abandon empathy, for I have argued that
empathy is indirectly necessary for moral motivation in that empathy is necessary
for the formation of sympathy, and sympathy (together with theory of mind) is
further necessary and sufficient for moral motivation in a Scottish Sentimentalist
view. Therefore, if my view is correct, Bloom would be wrong in claiming that we
are morally better off without empathy, for we would not be concerned about
anything and anyone without empathy, even if empathy might sometimes lead to
morally objectionable acts that cannot be controlled and guided by reason
(which I doubt).
5.

Three Anticipated Objections

The first anticipated objection to my argument asks: if I agree with Bloom
that sympathy (together with theory of mind) can be sufficient to generate specific
moral motivations without empathy, doesn’t that mean empathy is not necessary
for sympathy in specific cases? If so, in what sense are the three-fold contributions
of empathy necessary for sympathy?
Let me begin by adding a minor distinction regarding sympathy. Recall
that I use ‘sympathy’ in the same way with Bloom, which means the act of feeling
concern for other people’s well-being. Now let us distinguish sympathy from
sympathetic concern: the former is a specific short-term episode of feeling concern
for something (e.g., a social issue) or someone, while the latter is a long-term
mental state of being concerned about something or someone. With this
distinction in hand, we can see that my argument for the three-fold contribution of
empathy to sympathy only means to show that empathy is necessary for the initial
formation of a sympathetic concern instead of every specific short-term episode of
sympathy in which we feel the pre-existing sympathetic concern for other people.
That said, I am arguing that we cannot form any long-term sympathetic concern
without empathy providing us the appreciation of others’ feelings, the empathic
perspective-taking as a breaker of the boundary between self and others, and the
phenomenal knowledge about how bad others’ suffering feels, though I admit that
once a long-term sympathetic concern has formed based on empathy, it can
generate specific episodes of sympathy later together with theory of mind without
the help of empathy. For example, Oscar has never been concerned about the
social issue of sexual harassment against women until he happens to watch a
documentary illustrating the narrative details of women’s experience of being
sexually harassed. With the help of those narrative details, Oscar forms strong
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empathy with the women victims, which generates a firm, stable long-term
sympathetic concern for the sexual harassment issue. Later he becomes a lawyer
engaged with supporting sexual harassment victims. In his job, he shows sympathy
to every victim he assists, but he does not feel much empathy anymore to avoid
being too distressed to work efficiently. So, although empathy can be unnecessary
for every specific episode of sympathy and moral motivation, it is necessary for
the formation of the long-term sympathetic concern.
The second anticipated objection questions that it seems we are willing to
empathize with those in suffering because we have already had a concern for their
well-being, instead of the other way around.26 For people who have already had
concern for a kind of issue or a person, empathy can help them discover more
problems and suffering that they want to deal with; but for people lacking the
concern for a particular issue or person in the first place, the recognition of the
problem or suffering seems to only bother them instead of triggering their
sympathy.
I have two replies to this objection. First, the idea that sympathetic concern
which already existed can promote empathy is compatible with my view. Back to
the Oscar example. We see that the developed sympathetic concern for sexual
harassment issue makes Oscar become a lawyer engaged with assisting sexual
harassment victims, and thus makes him more likely to be exposed to victims and
empathizing with them, though Oscar chooses to suppress his empathic distress
later for the sake of offering more professional assistance.
But second, the benefit of sympathetic concern to empathy does not mean
that the initial formation of sympathetic concern can develop without empathy. In
fact, an implicit assumption behind the given objection to my view is that
empathy can only be intentional and effortful, which is thus taken to require a preexisting sympathetic concern or general kindness. However, this assumption is
problematic. On the one hand, empathy could be (and maybe is often) triggered
passively, automatically, unconsciously. In Batson’s influential experimental
studies of the association between empathy and moral motivation, the experiment
is cleverly designed in a way that makes the suffering salient enough so that it is
hard to ignore. As a result, although it is the first time for the subjects to meet the
sufferer in the experiment, most of them are found to have different degrees of
empathic reactions to the sufferer. 27 We can also see passive and unintentional
empathy in the Oscar case in which Oscar happens to watch the sexual harassment
documentary and thus unintentionally forms empathy with the victims.
On the other hand, in cognitive science, the latest study of the development
of fellow feelings shows that empathy does develop prior to sympathy. As

26

It seems that Bloom also would like to make this objection, though he uses a way more general
concept ‘kindness’ instead of ‘sympathy’ or ‘concern’ in particular in the book. “It’s not that
empathy itself automatically leads to kindness. Rather, empathy has to connect to kindness that
already exists. Empathy makes good people better, then, because kind people don’t like suffering,
and empathy makesthis suffering salient.” Supra note 7, at 66.
27
Supra note 11.
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Spaulding et al 28 survey, the development of fellow feelings starts with the
emergence of emotional congation at birth, followed by personal distress
affected by recognizing other people’s suffering very early. Then, the real
empathy capacity – namely affective perspective-taking abilities – develops
sometime in the two-year-olds (though it is only directed at other people’s simple
emotions in simple contexts). For instance, as shown in the experiments done by
Denham (1986) 29 and Vaish et al30, the two-year-olds start to emotionally attribute
correct emotional reactions through perspective-taking because the targets do not
display apparent emotional cues to the babies in the experiments. Unsurprisingly,
the capacity for theory of mind and sympathy develops later than empathy. In
particular, it is argued that the capacity for sympathy is relatively late-developing
because it requires more mental mechanisms, including perspective-taking, theory
of mind, the awareness of self in contrast to others, and emotional self-regulation.
The last anticipated objection is also somehow inspired by Bloom. It
seems that Bloom wants to agree that past empathy is needed for generating
sympathy from theory of mind, though this seems to be inconsistent with his
claim that “on balance, we are better off without it (empathy).”31 He writes:
“There is a world of difference, after all, between understanding the
misery of the person who is talking to you because you have felt misery in
the past, even though now you are calm, and understanding the misery of
the person who is talking to you because you are mirroring them and
feeling their misery right now. The first, which doesn’t involve empathy
in any sense, just understanding, has all the advantages of the second and
none of its costs.”32

In light of this, perhaps what Bloom proposes is not to eliminate empathy from the
start, but rather the idea that we should no longer use empathy to motivate moral
behaviors after it has generated the long-term sympathetic concern which is
sufficient for morality with the help of theory of mind. However, this modification
of Bloom’s proposal is still problematic. As I have argued in section 4, one of the
contributions of empathy is to provide us with an appreciation of other people’s
suffering after we recognize their situation, which is important for us to form
concern for new social issues. Recall the Oscar example. He lives in an era that
witnessed the revolution of the social concern of sexual harassment, which was a
new issue to him when he first learned about it. If Scottish Sentimentalists follow
28 28
Spaulding,

Shannon, Rita Svetlova, and Hannah Read. “The Nature of Empathy.” in
Philosophy of Neuroscience, edited by Felipe De Brigard and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, MIT Press,
forthcoming.
29
Denham, Susanne A. 1986. "Social cognition, prosocial behavior, and emotion in preschoolers:
Contextual validation." Child development:194-201.
30
Vaish, Amrisha, Malinda Carpenter, and Michael Tomasello. 2009. "Sympathy through affective
perspective taking and its relation to prosocial behavior in toddlers." Developmental psychology
45(2):534
31
Supra note 7, at 33.
32
Supra note 7, at 130.
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Bloom’s proposal, they cannot ask Oscar to use empathy anymore when watching
the documentary provided that Oscar has formed almost all the basic sympathetic
concern. If so, although Oscar might recognize the victims’ suffering by theory of
mind, he cannot appreciate their distress as appropriate given the detailed reports
of their situation. So, as I have argued in section 4, Oscar would not form
sympathetic concern that changes his life without using empathy. Similarly, since
new social issues would come up with the development of human society,
especially technologies, we still need to continue to use empathy for forming
sympathetic concern for new social issues.
6.

Conclusion

The main project of this book has been focused on whether Scottish
Sentimentalists about moral motivation should abandon the fellow feeling of
empathy in explaining moral motivation. I began the exploration by considering
Bloom’s skepticism about the significance of empathy to moral motivation.
Bloom argues that sympathy is sufficient for moral motivation with the help of
theory of mind, and that empathy often motivates altruistic behaviors in a morally
objectionable way that goes against justice and fairness, and therefore concludes
that we are better off without empathy from a Scottish Sentimentalist perspective.
Then, I made a diagnosis of Bloom’s view, arguing that Bloom does not
answer where sympathy comes from, and that theory of mind as the most
available resource for him is not sufficient to generate sympathy. Enlightened by
psychological studies of the association between lack of empathy and lack of
moral concern in psychopaths, I explored whether empathy can explain the
formation of sympathy. I first correct Bloom’s mischaracterization of empathy by
adopting the latest consensus on the nature of empathy: real empathy is to feel
what one believes to be appropriate for other people to feel in their situation
through imagining being them and figuring out what one would feel in their
situation. Then I provided my central argument for the idea that empathy is
necessary for sympathy (or rather, sympathetic concern) by making three
contributions that theory of mind cannot make: the appreciation of other people’s
suffering given their situation, the empathic perspective-taking that breaks the
boundary between self and others, and the phenomenal knowledge of how bad
other people’s suffering feels. Hence, since empathy is necessary for sympathy,
and sympathy is both necessary and sufficient (together with theory of mind) for
moral motivation from a Scottish Sentimentalist perspective, I conclude that
empathy is indirectly necessary for moral motivation, and therefore Scottish
Sentimentalists about moral motivation cannot abandon empathy.
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